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This article develops the concept of wrongful depathologization, in which a psychiatric disorder is 
simultaneously stigmatized (because of sanist attitudes towards mental illness) and trivialized (as it 
is not considered a “proper” illness). We use OCD as a case study to argue that cumulatively these 
two effects generate a profound epistemic injustice to OCD sufferers, and possibly to those with other 
mental disorders. We show that even seemingly positive stereotypes attached to mental disorders 
give rise to both testimonial injustice and wilful hermeneutical ignorance. We thus expose an 
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 Introduction 
In the philosophy of psychiatry, there is a wealth of research on the systematic 
mistreatment of people with mental health problems (Perlin 1992; Thornicroft 
2006; Kidd 2019). Recent literature has brought to light a particularly insidious 
form of mistreatment that has been previously overlooked. This is epistemic 
injustice: the wrongful treatment of marginalized individuals qua epistemic agents. 
In the context of mental disorder, epistemic injustice occurs when ill persons are 
belittled, silenced, or have their testimonies ignored because of prejudices that 
depict them as irrational, unreliable, or epistemically defective. The stigma 
surrounding a psychiatric diagnosis is so detrimental to a person’s epistemic 
standing that “many Mad persons opt to conceal their psychiatric histories” 
altogether (LeBlanc and Kinsella 2016, 66).  
Here, we identify a new and distinct form of epistemic harm. Whereas sanist 
attitudes depict people with mental illness as “dangerous and frightening,” 
“incompetent to participate in ‘normal’ activities,” “morally repugnant,” and “other” 
(Perlin 1992, 389–396), what we term wrongful depathologization devalues the 
epistemic status of such people by reducing their symptoms to mere personality 
traits, thus denying them a fully recognized psychiatric identity. One manifestation 
of wrongful depathologization is the de-prioritization of psychiatric patients by 
health professionals in favour of “patients who are really ill” (Thornicroft 2006, 96). 
Another manifestation is the characterization of persons with mental illness as “just 
like everyone else,” yet labelled as “difficult,” “manipulative,” or “attention-seeking” 
(Thornicroft 2006, 94). 
We argue that wrongful depathologization involves simultaneously stigmatizing 
and trivializing a mental disorder and that therein lies its harmfulness. This creates 
a twilight zone of mental disorder, where the ill person is deemed to both exaggerate 
their difficulties (trivialization) and to be epistemically suspect because of their 
psychiatric diagnosis (stigmatization). Thus, people with certain types of mental 
illness are judged to be too ill to be free of stigma but not ill enough to be taken 
seriously. In other words, while the individual is stigmatized for belonging to the 
marginalized community of “the mentally disordered,” their disorder itself is subject 
to trivialization. One form this trivialization may take is positive stereotyping, 
through which a mental disorder is reduced to a merely eccentric personality trait. 
We provide a detailed study of this process in the case of Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder (hereafter OCD).  
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 defines the terms and explains the 
difference between “pathologization” and “medicalization.” Section 3 expands 
Miranda Fricker’s understanding of epistemic injustice to include cases of credibility 
deficit motivated by positive stereotypes. Section 4 demonstrates how the 
trivialization caused by positive stereotypes, combined with pathophobic 
stigmatization, can lead to the wrongful depathologization of OCD. Section 5 
considers the testimonial injustice that can arise from this wrongful 
depathologization. Section 6 explores a unique form of Gaile Pohlhaus Jr’s “wilful 
hermeneutical ignorance” (2012), through which hermeneutical resources used to 
capture the pathological experience of OCD are misappropriated to describe the 
experiences of dominantly situated people who do not have a mental disorder. We 
conclude that the depathologization of psychiatric illnesses has epistemic and social 
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ramifications that have gone unrecognized and that require careful articulation, that 
we begin to provide here. 
 Pathologization versus Medicalization 
To understand depathologization, we need to first ask: what is it to pathologize behaviour? 
As we understand the concept, to pathologize is to view a behaviour as abnormal, unhealthy, 
and requiring special treatment. In contrast, to depathologize is to stop seeing a certain 
behaviour as abnormal. Depathologization is often seen as righting a social injustice and 
combating the stigmatization of a marginalized group, whose members have been viewed 
as behaving in ways that are “deviant,” “unnatural,” or “sick.”  
A pathologized behaviour can later also be medicalized, that is, classified as a medical 
disorder. We define medicalization here narrowly (in order to distinguish it clearly from 
pathologization, which is a broader societal process) as the recognition of particular 
behaviours or symptoms as constituting a medically recognized disorder. Thus, to 
demedicalize a condition is to rescind it from medical classification, thereby no longer 
seeing it as falling within the realm of medicine.1  
The terms “medicalization” and “pathologization” are sometimes used interchangeably, 
yet there are significant differences between the two. We suggest that pathologization 
happens first, when a society begins to see certain behaviours as abnormal and requiring 
attention and regulation. 2  Although pathologization is independent of nosology, it can 
influence the medicalization of a condition. Medicalization can—but doesn’t always—follow 
pathologization. 
This is how we will be using these terms in this article, and we limit ourselves to a 
discussion of how they operate in mental disorder. Other authors have discussed 
medicalization more broadly, most recently Jonathan Sholl (2017). For Sholl, 
medicalization is far broader than pathologization and includes social phenomena such as 
diet and exercise that lie outside the notion of medicalization as we understand it. A 
narrower conception of medicalization will better serve our purposes here, given that we 
wish to identify the interplay between medical and non-medical social-epistemic processes. 
To demonstrate the relationship between pathologization and medicalization, let us 
consider the frequently cited example of homosexuality. Homosexuality can be found in 
psychiatric classification systems dating at least as far back as 1886.3 This medicalization 
was the result of a long history of pathologizing homosexuality as a “disease” within society. 
In turn, classifying homosexuality as a diagnostic category was a major catalyst for 
stigmatization, as its presence in diagnostic manuals grounded homophobic prejudice in 
the seemingly scientific domain of psychiatry. Thus, medicalization sealed homosexuality’s 
pathological status. Eventually, activists lobbied the American Psychiatric Association for 
the demedicalization of homosexuality until it was removed from diagnostic manuals such 
as the DSM in 1973 (Drescher 2015, 570) and more recently from the ICD-10 in 1992 
(Cochran et al. 2014). Although the pathologizing view of homosexuality persists in some 
cultures, it has largely faded into obscurity in many contemporary societies. In the latter 
cases, the demedicalization of homosexuality was part of a more general process of 
depathologization, whereby natural human behaviour (such as homosexuality) is no longer 
considered pathological. 
 
1 Other scholars have defined medicalization differently—see Sholl (2017) and Halfmann (2012).  
2 This is not to say that all atypical behaviours become pathologized. For instance, walking barefoot outside is 
an atypical, but non-pathological, behaviour. Only a subset of atypical behaviours is subject to pathologization. 
We thank an anonymous reviewer and Dan Degerman for raising this point.  
3 Homosexuality was listed as a sexual pathology in the original German edition of Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s 
Psychopathia Sexualis (London: Hogarth Press, 1899), which was published in 1886.  
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With the example of homosexuality at the forefront of the literature, one might assume 
that pathologization of human behaviour is always grounded in the undue stigmatization of 
a marginalized group as abnormal or “sick.” Accordingly, it may seem that 
depathologization constitutes a righting of social injustice. This is indeed the position of 
neurodiversity proponents, who advocate depathologization as a means of combating the 
stigmatization of the neurodiverse.4 Broadly, the neurodiversity movement asserts that it is 
the lack of accommodation for neurocognitive differences within society that is debilitating, 
as opposed to the condition itself. From this perspective, we can only remove the prejudicial 
lens through which we view minority neuro-types by propagating a shift away from 
pathologizing attitudes towards neurodiversity.5  
Although depathologization has heretofore been considered a largely positive process, 
in this article we articulate its negative impact in psychiatry. We examine how a mental 
disorder might lose its pathological status in public discourse whilst retaining its medical 
status, resulting in a diffusion of the clinical definition and a masking of its serious and 
debilitating nature. We argue that depathologization can therefore be harmful. Our aim is 
to articulate a new harm, driven not by pathophobic attitudes but rather by what we term 
wrongful depathologization, which deflates the status of mental illness as legitimate or 
“real.” We further claim that wrongful depathologization is a unique form of epistemic 
injustice. 
 Epistemic Injustice and Positive Identity Prejudice 
In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Fricker sought to conceptualize 
a neglected area of social injustice, in which a marginalized speaker suffers an injustice by 
virtue of being afforded an unduly low epistemic status (Fricker 2007). The epistemic 
nature of the injustice derives from a person being wronged in their capacity as a knower, 
someone who can convey knowledge or information, participate in the creation and sharing 
of knowledge, and who can offer interpretations of their social experiences that are accepted 
as valid. Fricker identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and 
hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs where identity prejudice causes a 
hearer to unjustly afford diminished credibility to a speaker’s testimony. Hermeneutical 
injustice occurs when identity prejudice causes gaps in interpretive frameworks, so 
experiences of marginalized groups are either lacking in hermeneutical currency altogether 
or are dismissed in favour of socially dominant interpretations.  
Epistemic injustice is not present in all cases in which a person’s epistemic credibility is 
diminished. One can only be said to have suffered an epistemic injustice if the credibility 
deficit is rooted in prejudice (Fricker 2007, 30). For instance, I may doubt the reliability of 
a person’s testimony if they are a notorious liar. This would be a rational and just reason to 
assign them low credibility. What makes epistemic injustice distinct is that it is motivated 
by identity prejudice. Fricker uses this term to refer to prejudice driven by socially instituted 
stereotypes: “a distorted image of the social type in question” (Fricker 2007, 4). This 
understanding of identity prejudice grounds the developing literature on epistemic injustice 
in psychiatric illness. For example, take the identity prejudice that people with mental 
 
4 Proponents of the neurodiversity movement champion terms such as “those with neurocognitive differences” 
and “neurominorities,” as opposed to “those with mental disorders”’ or “mental illness,” as they consider the 
latter to reinforce pathologizing models. In addition, the term “neuro-typical” is opted for in place of “normal” 
or “sane” (Chapman 2019). 
5 Similar arguments have been made in the philosophy of disability and in disability studies. A prominent 
proponent is Elizabeth Barnes, who claims that “the disabled body is a pathologized body. It’s a body that departs 
from ‘normal’ in ways we assume are bad or suboptimal. Disability pride rejects this pathologization” (Barnes 
2016, 186). See also T. Shakespeare, Disability: The Basics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018). 
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health problems are “cognitively impaired or emotionally compromised”: this motivates a 
deflated level of credibility ascribed to people with psychiatric illness, so that their 
testimonies are dismissed as unreliable (Crichton, Carel and Kidd 2017).  
Fricker acknowledges that prejudice may not necessarily take an overtly pejorative form 
and offers the following definition: “judgements, which may have a positive or a negative 
valence, and which display some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter‐
evidence owing to some affective investment on the part of the subject” (Fricker 2007, 35). 
However, she concludes that it is negative identity prejudice that drives epistemic injustice: 
“This affective investment may or may not be ethically bad, but given our central concern 
with systematic testimonial injustice, we have a special interest in negative identity 
prejudices, and these are, I take it, always generated by some ethically bad affective 
investment.”  
Fricker understands negative identity prejudice to be “prejudices with a negative 
valence held against people qua social type,” and adds that it is “certainly the most morally 
problematic kind of prejudice, and it is the kind we are most interested in” (Fricker 2007, 
34–35). According to Fricker, negative identity prejudice is motivated by morally bad 
assumptions about the marginalized subject. She discusses Nomy Arpaly’s example of 
Solomon, ‘a boy who lives in a small isolated farming community in a poor country,’ who 
holds the belief that women are irrational (a belief grounded in contempt for women), 
perhaps even when exposed to evidence to the contrary (Fricker 2007, 34). For Fricker, it is 
this morally bad assumption that is central to the injustice in epistemic injustice. By 
establishing negative identity prejudice as central to epistemic injustice, the literature has 
generally followed Fricker in assuming negative identity prejudice as the sole driver of 
credibility deficit (with the exception of Emmalon Davis, whom we discuss below). 
And yet, we have long known that prejudices with a seemingly positive valence are 
equally divisive. On the surface, positive stereotypes may appear to right the wrongs of 
negative stereotypes: “Women aren’t less capable than men; they are more empathetic and 
nurturing,” or “Black people aren’t less accomplished than white people; all the best athletes 
are Black” are some examples of this. We suggest that in some cases, positive stereotypes 
may be more insidious than their negative counterparts because their putatively 
complimentary appearance makes them harder to detect: “In contemporary contexts the 
relative ease with which positive stereotypes can ‘fly under the radar’ and evade red flags 
may, ironically, make them more damaging to general egalitarian social beliefs than not 
only the absence of any stereotypic information but negative stereotypes, too” (Kay et al. 
2013, 287).To test this assumption, Aaron C. Kay et al. conducted a study revealing the 
impact of the racial stereotype ‘Black people are superior athletes’ upon non-marginalized 
hearers. They found that positive stereotypes “are less likely to produce skepticism about 
their veracity” than their negative counterparts (Kay et al. 2013, 291).  
Drawing from this literature, we suggest that despite their positive valence, these 
stereotypes are harmful in at least four ways: 
1. Positive stereotypes can compromise the well-being of members of their associated 
group as a result of an increased expectation to live up to the stereotype. For 
instance, “if Black women overly identify with the [strong black woman] image, they 
may feel as if they have to live up to societal expectations of invincibility and 
indestructibility, even in the face of significant stress” (West, Donovan and Daniel 
2016, 394). This study found that Black women who identified with this stereotype 
often avoided therapy and struggled with their mental health.  
2.  When a positively stereotyped individual fails to live up to these positive attributes, 
they may experience persecution. For instance, Yanshu Huang et al. (2016) found 
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that the positive stereotype of maternality attached to women intensifies the 
stigmatization they experience if they terminate a pregnancy. In addition, because 
of their marginalized status, the individual does not possess the epistemic authority 
to challenge such persecution.  
3. Positive stereotypes emphasize group differences between marginalized and non-
marginalized people. Examining the so-called positive stereotype ‘Black people are 
superior athletes,’ Kay et al. (2013) argue that such stereotypes indicate a 
performance difference between Black and non-Black people. The hearer is then left 
to explain where the disparity lies, possibly by appealing to some presumed 
biological difference.  
4. Positive stereotypes draw attention to juxtaposing negative stereotypes attached to 
the marginalized group in question. In this instance, the positive stereotype ‘Black 
people are superior athletes’ conjured in the participant’s mind the negative 
stereotype ‘Black people are inferior intellectually’ (Kay et al. 2013).  
This is not an exhaustive account of the harmful impact positive stereotypes can produce; 
there are doubtless other examples. Rather, we offer these as a platform from which we can 
argue in the following section that what may seem like a positive construal of OCD does not 
reduce epistemic injustice but, in fact, exacerbates it. To launch our own account of the 
negative epistemic impact of positive stereotypes, we first discuss the work of Davis, who 
identifies how credibility excess, based on positive identity prejudice, can be detrimental. 
Davis (2016) begins by broadening Fricker’s scope of testimonial injustice to include 
José Medina’s characterization of credibility excess, through which “those who have an 
undeserved (or arbitrarily given) credibility excess are judged comparatively more worthy 
of epistemic trust than other subjects, all things being equal” (Medina 2011, 20). Drawing 
on Medina, Davis proposes that testimonial injustice can arise when a marginalized group 
is afforded epistemic privilege in a particular domain. For instance, a gay man may be 
wrongly attributed with credibility excess in the realm of fashion, or an Asian student may 
be wrongly attributed with a credibility excess in the domain of mathematics. According to 
Davis, credibility excess can constitute testimonial injustice if an identity prejudice (positive 
or negative) leads to an unmerited credibility assessment. Davis provides the following 
example: “A male shopper walks up to another shopper in a discount retailer and asks where 
he can find dryer sheets. ‘I don’t know … I don’t work here,’ the shopper responds. 
Somewhat baffled, the man replies, ‘I know you don’t work here, but you’re a woman!’” 
(Davis 2016, 487). 
The positive stereotype of “women are shopping experts” has led the male shopper to 
identify this woman as a “knower” in this specific domain. In Davis’s account, the 
testimonial injustice lies in (i) the reduction of an individual’s epistemic agency to that of a 
marginalized group, and (ii) presuming to know which epistemic exchanges a marginalized 
group is best suited to (Davis 2016, 495). As these cases clearly depict how prejudice 
influences the credibility afforded to a marginalized subject’s testimony, Davis claims that 
credibility excess ought to be included within Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice, 
as “credibility excess often operates alongside credibility deficit to define the social, 
epistemic, and professional realities of marginalized individuals” (Davis 2016, 493). 
Davis concludes with the hope that her paper “articulates a way in which the conceptual 
framework of epistemic injustice might be further opened” (Davis 2016, 495). We take Davis 
up on her invitation to furnish this conceptual framework by uncovering a further way in 
which positive identity prejudice can lead to epistemic harm. While Davis argues that 
positive identity prejudice can lead to a detrimental form of credibility excess, we suggest 
that positive identity prejudice can lead to credibility deficit through trivialization.  
Lucienne Spencer and Havi Carel  |  7 
 
Philosophy of Medicine  |  DOI 10.5195/pom.2021.19 | Volume 2 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-18 
We argue that positive stereotypes can dilute a psychiatric diagnosis such as OCD by 
emphasizing the usefulness of traits such as being tidy, making lists, and being organized. 
Such emphasis on the putatively positive aspects of OCD has several damaging effects. First, 
it can obscure OCD’s debilitating symptoms by making it appear to be a useful and positive 
set of traits. Because OCD is trivialized by people without OCD, testimony about the 
condition’s negative effects may be dismissed as exaggerated. Second, the positive 
stereotype can create an unrealistic ideal that people with OCD cannot live up to. This may 
put additional pressure on them. And third, positive stereotypes reduce the hermeneutical 
force of the term ‘OCD’ itself, so that the key hermeneutical resource used to articulate the 
negative aspects of their experience has been obscured. This is a case of appropriation, in 
which people without the condition misuse the term, robbing people with OCD of an 
important hermeneutical resource.  
In the following sections, we show that, although no negative stereotype has been 
activated, the seemingly positive stereotype gives rise to a dual type of epistemic injustice, 
where the condition is simultaneously stigmatized and trivialized, that is, what we term 
“wrongful depathologization.” This will support our argument that positive identity 
prejudice can lead to credibility deficit, with harmful results.  
 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: Stigmatization and Trivialization 
The Mental Health Foundation (2015) states that “people with mental health problems are 
amongst the least likely of any group with a long-term health condition or disability to find 
work, be in a steady, long-term relationship, live in decent housing [or] be socially included 
in mainstream society.” To uncover the social structures that sustain such marginalization, 
we turn to the fast-growing interdisciplinary literature on the stigmatization of psychiatric 
illness. This work exposes prejudicial attitudes towards psychiatric illness, according to 
which people with bipolar disorder are “unbalanced, not in control, [and] aggressive” 
(Bonnington and Rose 2014, 12); those with schizophrenia are “bizarre, incomprehensible 
and irrational” (Sanati and Kyratsous 2015, 484); and people with depression are 
“unpredictable” and “weak” (Li, Jiao, and Zhu 2018, 361).  
Such stigma and prejudice directed at ill people have been dubbed “pathophobia” by Ian 
James Kidd, who coined the term to capture the variety of morally objectionable attitudes 
and behaviours, through which ill people are treated as “abnormal” relative to their 
“normal” counterparts (Kidd 2019). When considering mental disorder, such stigma can be 
attributed to the powerful “sanism” embedded within our social norms, through which 
people with mental illness are discriminated against and oppressed. Following terms such 
as “racism,” “sexism,” or “homophobia,” Michael L. Perlin popularized the term “sanism” 
to draw attention to the discriminatory distinction between the “mad” and the “sane.”6 
In the philosophy of psychiatry, scholars share the assumption that such pathophobic 
attitudes are the sole cause of epistemic injustice for those with psychiatric illness (Bueter 
2019; Kurs and Grinshpoon 2018; Sanati and Kyratsous 2015; LeBlanc and Kinsella 2016; 
Scrutton 2017). Yet, the credibility deficit imposed upon sufferers of epistemic injustice 
cannot be sufficiently understood through negative identity prejudice. Positive identity 
prejudice, as shown in the previous section, can operate in this way too. In this section, we 
show how the positive stereotypes attached to OCD can trivialize the condition for the wider 
public.  
 
6 While Perlin popularized the term “sanism,” it is worth noting that it was the lawyer and mental health 
advocate Morton Birnbaum who first coined the term during a trial in 1960. A further important contribution 
to the literature was the term “mentalism,” which captures the exact same injustice, introduced by Judith 
Chamberlain in 1975 (however, the latter term did not receive the same level of uptake).  
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The DSM-5 defines obsessions as “recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges or images 
that are experienced as intrusive and unwanted” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, 
235). These obsessions commonly concern contamination, symmetry, or incompleteness, 
responsibility for harm, or intrusive taboo thoughts (McCarty et al. 2017, 64). Compulsions 
are then defined as “repetitive behaviours or mental acts that an individual feels driven to 
perform in response to an obsession or according to rules that must be applied rigidly.” The 
DSM-5 describes the functional impact of OCD as a “reduced quality of life as well as high 
levels of social and occupational impairment” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, 
240).  
OCD is time-consuming because of both obsessing and carrying out compulsions. It 
limits activities in order to prevent the symptoms from being triggered; it obstructs the 
completion of tasks. For instance, “obsessions about symmetry can derail the timely 
completion of school or work projects because the project never feels ‘just right’” (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013, 240). If the disorder concerns contamination, it may lead the 
person with OCD to avoid hospitals and doctors for fear of uncleanliness, introducing a 
further health risk. The functional impairment experienced by a person with OCD is visible 
in the following example:  
 
Amy is a 25-year-old woman who fears that she might cause a catastrophic 
fire if she does not ensure she has turned off all electrical appliances and the 
gas cooker. After using appliances, she repeatedly checks that they are 
switched off, returning up to 50 times. In the past two years, she has tried to 
avoid using all electrical or gas appliances and asks her mother, with whom 
she lives, to use these for her. If she does have to use an appliance, she will 
repeatedly ask her mother for reassurance that she has not caused a fire 
(Drummond 2018, 3).  
 
Despite the severity of these symptoms, many diagnosed with OCD claim that their illness 
is not perceived as having the same legitimacy as other mental disorders, even by healthcare 
professionals: ‘OCD is a nightmare that cannot be imagined by those who do not have it. It’s 
usually made light of in the media and frequently misunderstood by clinicians and 
misdiagnosed and undertreated or mistreated by physicians … I hear professionals joke 
about OCD all the time’ (Fennell and Boyd 2014, 681).  
We suggest that persons with OCD suffer wrongful depathologization when they are 
simultaneously stigmatized and trivialized. On the one hand, they may be seen as less 
reliable epistemic agents because they have a mental disorder, and hence are more 
vulnerable to epistemic injustice, as has been argued previously (Bueter 2019; Kurs and 
Grinshpoon 2018; Sanati and Kyratsous 2015; LeBlanc and Kinsella 2016; Scrutton 2017). 
On the other hand, the positive stereotypes associated with OCD trivialize the disorder. As 
such, persons with OCD may not be considered ill enough to receive support and 
recognition, and their treatment may thus be compromised.  
Rachelle L. Pavelko and Jessica Gall Myrick argue that the trivialization of OCD in the 
media may alter people’s perception of the mental disorder in a different but potentially as 
harmful way as stigmatization: “Biased portrayals of mental illnesses are not all purely 
negative. Instead, they may also make light of and even define the condition as beneficial” 
(Pavelko and Myrick 2019, 8). One way in which those with OCD are subject to trivialization 
is by being ascribed “super-human” properties. Pavelko and Myrick offer the example of a 
detective in the television series Monk; the “sharp memory, specific mindset, and attention 
to detail” attached to the detective’s OCD aid him in solving complex cases (Wikipedia 
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2021). The media often depicts people with OCD as “highly functional and intelligent—
contributing to society in sometimes extraordinary ways” (Pavelko and Myrick 2019, 1). 
Oversimplification of a mental disorder often suggests that the diagnosed person will 
“somehow benefit or experience an improved quality of life due to their diagnosis because 
of the super-human traits it affords” (Pavelko and Myrick 2019, 4).  
A further example of the trivialization of OCD in the media can be found in an interview 
with television personality Michelle Mone, who has self-diagnosed as having OCD. On Good 
Morning Britain, she claimed, “I love having OCD. It makes me really organized. And I’ve 
always believed that if your drawers are really organized and tidy, then your life will be 
organized” (Good Morning Britain 2015). Here, we have a portrayal of OCD as a set of 
positive personality traits. When asked if she experiences any negative impact from the 
disorder, she briefly mentions having to resist organizing other people’s homes, before 
reaffirming the positive aspects of the disorder. Although prompted by the interviewers, 
Mone fails to highlight thought insertion, an essential feature of OCD that forces those with 
the condition to pray, count, repeat words silently, wash their hands, and so on, in ways that 
intrude upon their daily life. By reinforcing this false positive stereotype, the debilitating 
nature of OCD becomes invisible. 
The source of the trivialization, in this case, is that the term “OCD” has been 
appropriated by someone who has not been diagnosed with the condition and does not 
experience the full set of symptoms and problems it causes. Thus, a psychiatric term used 
to describe a certain kind of mental disorder is appropriated by those who do not experience 
the condition in question and thus trivialize it.  
Appropriation is an important process in its own right, as discussed by Davis (2018). 
Davis understands epistemic appropriation as the dissemination of epistemic resources by 
a dominant group that were initially cultivated for and by a marginalized group. Her 
example is the misattribution of Harriet Taylor Mill’s The Enfranchisement of Women to 
John Stuart Mill. Davis dissociates epistemic appropriation from Fricker’s conception of 
hermeneutical injustice “because epistemic appropriation primarily concerns our practices 
of disseminating existing epistemic resources, it involves no conceptual deficit. Rather, 
epistemic appropriation involves a sort of conceptual theft” (Davis 2018, 719). The 
groundbreaking ideas presented in The Enfranchisement of Women suffer no conceptual 
deficit; the harm for Davis lies in the fact that Taylor Mills’s status as an epistemic 
contributor went unrecognized.  
In contrast, we identify a conceptual deficit caused by the trivialization of OCD. Note 
that in some cases, such as the ones we describe above, trivialization happens through 
appropriation. But trivialization can also take place in other ways. For example, if a person 
with OCD tells someone about their diagnosis and the hearer replies: “It doesn’t sound too 
serious.” They have not appropriated the term or the OCD narrative but nonetheless have 
trivialized the condition. 
We argue that the positive identity prejudice expressed by Mone, for example, trivializes 
OCD. As a result, OCD’s disease status is denigrated and occluded from societal 
understanding. Combined with the stigmatization attached to mental illness, those with 
OCD can be both stigmatized and trivialized, giving rise to wrongful depathologization. This 
causes people with OCD to suffer a deflated epistemic status because, through trivialization, 
they no longer have clear membership in the patient community. Two kinds of epistemic 
injustice emerge from such wrongful depathologization: testimonial injustice and a unique 
form of wilful hermeneutical ignorance, to which we now turn.  
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 Wrongful Depathologization and Testimonial Injustice 
Consider the following account of OCD, in which the person’s obsession concerns a fear of 
harm, triggered by the prospect of everyday activities such as crossing a busy road or using 
a big knife (Time to Change 2012). The obsessive fear of harm prevents this person with 
OCD from driving since, as she explains, “nothing could be more calculated to bring [the 
obsessions] on than the thought of being at the wheel of something that could run someone 
over”. She recounts her previous experiences of driving: 
 
While I was driving, I would be hypervigilant, hesitant and dangerously slow, 
someone who drives with her foot on the brake and uses it far too often. Even 
when I wasn’t driving, I would be spending precious time and energy 
ruminating about all the moments during the drive when it might have been 
possible for me to have killed someone. (Time to Change 2012)  
 
As a result of trivialization, such testimonies are often regarded as exaggerated, an excuse 
for laziness, or simply untrue, because they do not fit the positive stereotype of OCD. The 
narrator describes her frustration at being questioned so frequently on her refusal to drive 
and the disbelief she is met with because of her “suspiciously calm and reasonable” 
demeanour (Time to Change 2012). In this instance, the positive stereotypes attached to 
OCD can distort a hearer’s credibility judgement to the extent that the descriptions of her 
symptoms and her requests for support are dismissed as illegitimate. This is therefore 
clearly a case of testimonial injustice.  
Testimonial injustice has been shown to penetrate the psychiatric healthcare system 
itself. Many OCD patients report their testimonies not being taken seriously by healthcare 
practitioners, as the mental disorder is often perceived to be less debilitating than the 
patient claims. One OCD patient recalls their experience:  
 
I remember halfway through the assessment she said, “So what help do you 
need exactly? People with mental health issues can barely get themselves out 
of the house, they have no motivation to do anything. Are you sure you’re not 
just having a bad few weeks?” I understand she’s the professional, but 
unfortunately, she completely invalidated my mental wellbeing. I panicked 
and immediately started backtracking. I felt like I had to lie about my 
symptoms because they didn’t seem “good” or “correct” enough to actually 
get any help, and that I was stupid for finally taking steps to get help. (Time 
to Change 2019) 
 
In this instance, the healthcare professional seems to have mischaracterized OCD 
symptoms as those characteristic of depression. An inability to leave the house or get out of 
bed is not caused by a lack of motivation (as suggested by the healthcare professional) but 
arises from intrusive thoughts that correlate leaving the house with harm.  
Many people with OCD do not fit the picture of psychiatric illness described by the 
healthcare professional above. They may be fully capable of getting out of bed, going to work 
and socializing, yet they remain plagued by intrusive thoughts, urges, or compulsions to 
perform rituals. Nevertheless, many individuals with OCD face testimonial injustice in 
psychiatric healthcare because their illness is considered less severe compared to other 
mental disorders. This can be attributed to positive identity prejudices that depict people 
with OCD as high-functioning, whilst trivializing the debilitating aspects of the condition. 
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The next section will complete our formulation of wrongful depathologization by 
establishing a unique form of wilful hermeneutical ignorance that arises from the 
trivialization of OCD described above. This will lead us to conclude that cumulatively the 
two effects (testimonial injustice and wilful hermeneutical ignorance) generate a profound, 
if hidden, epistemic injustice to people with OCD, with important potential implications for 
other mental disorders.  
 Wrongful Depathologization and Wilful Hermeneutical Ignorance 
The notion of psychiatric illness has frequently been disputed and has often been subject to 
sceptical treatment. As a result, psychiatry has long strived for a scientific status to match 
that of somatic medicine. To compete with the prestige of somatic medical science, the DSM 
emerged in 1952—“a dictionary of disorder” that listed the symptoms for 21 pathologies 
(Greenberg 2013, 41). This included “compulsive personality” disorder, which soon evolved 
into “obsessive-compulsive” personality disorder by the second edition (Pfohl and Blum 
1991, 363).  
With the development of robust hermeneutical resources published in the DSM, one 
would think that the sceptical hermeneutical climate had been redressed. Yet psychiatric 
patients still fight for recognition of the legitimacy and reality of their disorders. Scepticism 
regarding the severity of psychiatric impairment persists, supporting entrenched prejudices 
that those with mental health problems are “hypochondriacs” (Bonnington and Rose 2014, 
13), “in control of their conditions” (Seah et al. 2017, 134), or “not trying hard enough” 
(Dawson 2018, 94). In this section, we show that the development of hermeneutical 
resources is not sufficient to combat the hermeneutical marginalization of people with 
psychiatric illness. Rather, the uptake these resources receive is critical to their ability to 
overcome hermeneutical injustice.   
According to Fricker’s original account, hermeneutical injustice occurs when a lacuna 
in the collectively available interpretative resources denies proper intelligibility and salience 
to experiences of marginally situated groups (Fricker 2007, 148). To correct hermeneutical 
injustice, a marginalized group must either establish novel hermeneutical resources that 
convey their experiences successfully or encourage uptake of their own locally developed 
resources within their wider social community. An example of the former can be found in 
Fricker’s discussion of sexual harassment as a developed hermeneutical resource used to 
articulate unwanted sexual behaviour (Fricker 2007, 151). The latter is proposed by 
Pohlhaus Jr (2012), who suggests that dominantly situated individuals need to take up 
currently localized hermeneutical resources to grant them widespread epistemic force. 
Without uptake of these hermeneutical resources, marginalized individuals cannot 
successfully communicate their experience, whether within or beyond their own 
communities: “When a group with material power is vested in ignoring certain parts of the 
world, they can maintain their ignorance by refusing to recognize and by actively 
undermining any newly generated epistemic resource that attends to those parts of the 
world that they are vested in ignoring” (Pohlhaus Jr 2012, 729).  
As the experiences of marginally situated knowers extend beyond the scope of those 
more dominantly situated, the latter are never required to understand these experiences. 
Turning away from experiences of marginalized groups in this way, Pohlhaus Jr argues, is 
an act of wilful hermeneutical ignorance. She revisits Fricker’s discussion of Harper Lee’s 
novel To Kill A Mockingbird and reframes the epistemic harm experienced by Lee’s 
character Tom Robinson as wilful hermeneutical ignorance: “It is not simply that the true 
meaning of Robinson’s words is unintelligible to the jury, but also that those words are 
received by the jury in a way that means something entirely different from Robinson’s actual 
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accurate account” (Pohlhaus Jr 2012, 726). In cases of wilful hermeneutical ignorance, 
hermeneutical resources developed by marginally situated knowers are wilfully 
misunderstood by the dominantly situated knowers (in Lee’s novel, the jury).  
We suggest that a similar process happens in some mental disorders. In OCD, or other 
mental disorders, hermeneutical resources can be developed by marginally situated 
knowers (even if a psychiatric diagnostic term is initially developed by scientists or 
psychiatrists, rather than a person with OCD). Once the term exists—say, as a DSM 
diagnostic category—it can provide those with OCD with an identity and an understanding 
of their condition that can be further developed by them as individual narratives or as a 
group identity. However, these resources can then be appropriated by other, dominantly 
situated speakers, so that terms such as OCD become watered down and trivialized. 
In recent years we have seen diagnostic terms such as “OCD,” “Bipolar,” “Clinical 
Depression,” and “Autism” saturate public discourse. Once incorporated into everyday 
language, these terms are immediately vulnerable to misappropriation and easily subsumed 
by this broader parlance, using such terms in a loose sense. Gary Greenberg captures the 
casual way in which we wield these terms: 
 
The other day you were talking with a friend and explaining to her that you 
had to wash your dishes before you could leave the house, and you found 
yourself saying “I’m just so OCD, you know?” Or you’ve heard your friends 
do the same thing with their own or others’ quirks. “He’s pretty ADHD”, they 
might say. Or, “She’s clinically depressed.” (Greenberg 2013, 6–7)  
 
Through Pohlhaus Jr’s concept of wilful hermeneutical ignorance, we can come to 
understand how linguistic resources that belong to psychiatric patients can be robbed of 
their hermeneutic power through their misappropriation by dominantly situated knowers.7 
We see such seemingly trivial utterances as instances of wilful hermeneutical ignorance 
because the wrongful depathologization of diagnostic terms can suppress the existing 
hermeneutical resources of the marginalized knower. Misuse of diagnostic terminology 
dilutes its hermeneutical force and may even subsume the clinical meaning of the term 
within a colloquial one.  
The term “OCD” in public discourse rarely refers to the mental disorder but, rather, has 
become a shorthand description of someone who dislikes mess. A multifaceted mental 
disorder has been reduced to a personality trait. This now-dominant understanding of OCD 
is reflected in a recent advert for Virgin Voyages, which made light of the disorder. The 
advert states: “You can live like a rockstar or indulge your inner OCD, we don’t judge—we’re 
just giving you a luxurious place to do it” (Sheldrick 2019). The advert appeals to an 
understanding of OCD as a “guilty pleasure” derived from tidiness, not a mental disorder. 
A similar idea is captured in a recent advert by the hotel Fairy Hill, which depicts a fork out 
of place on an otherwise flawlessly arranged dinner table. The advert proclaims: “Slightly 
OCD? Then we’d love to hear from you”, assuming that the “slightly” OCD person would 
notice that the cutlery is misaligned (BBC News 2018). The advert conveys an 
understanding of OCD as simply liking order, excluding the intrusive and unwanted urge 
for symmetry or other obsessive thought insertions characteristic of OCD.  
 
7 It is interesting to note that in this instance of wilful hermeneutical ignorance the resource that has been 
suppressed has not stemmed from the marginalized group in question. Rather, diagnostic terminology such as 
“OCD” has been formed by medical experts. As the terminology serves the meaning-making capacities of the 
marginalized group, however, we posit that this case still ought to be identified as wilful hermeneutical 
ignorance.  
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The qualifier “slightly” can be deeply harmful. A search for “slightly OCD” on Twitter 
produces countless results, used in statements such as “Toilets bleached regularly and sinks 
thoroughly cleaned. I’ve become slightly OCD.”8 Or: “So, what does a *slightly* OCD person 
do while on a 14 day self-quarantine??? Yep, clean out EVERYTHING! Today was the 
Tupperware drawer …”.9 To suggest that someone can be “slightly” OCD is to undermine 
the term by qualifying its severity, or implying that it comes in degrees, shading through 
into normal behaviour.  
As Greenberg observes, “The power to give names to our pain is a mighty thing and easy 
to abuse” (Greenberg 2013, 7). By misrepresenting the meaning of the term “OCD,” the 
dominantly positioned (in this case, people without psychiatric illness) rob people with OCD 
of an essential hermeneutical tool to convey the nature of their condition. Consider the 
account below from one person with OCD, who describes the reaction of a financial agency 
he approached for support:  
 
You are a healthy big white person, who seems intelligent … [has] no obvious 
disabilities … what possible excuse could you have? Well, I am Obsessive-
Compulsive. 
Oh just that? … My roommate … likes to have our apartment tidy and 
everything placed just right, now there’s OCD! … [That’s] not anything 
serious like bipolar or schizophrenia; I think the problem is just that you are 
lazy! 
Oh how I hate that word “lazy.” It does no good trying to explain that the 
colloquial use of the word “OCD” is, at best, only superficially related to the 
medical [DSM-5] use of the term. (Fennell and Boyd 2014, 682; ellipses in 
the original). 
 
Unlike Fricker’s examples of hermeneutical lacunae, the person above is in possession of a 
hermeneutical resource that ought to successfully convey his experience to the financial 
agency. But because of the wrongful depathologization of OCD, this term has been 
appropriated to communicate not his illness but personality traits recognizable to the more 
dominantly situated.  
Although the hermeneutical resource “OCD” has been developed to serve those with the 
condition, the clinical meaning of the term has not received uptake by the general public. 
This is because the experience of thought insertions and uncontrollable compulsive 
behaviour is largely alien to the world of dominantly situated knowers. More familiar to this 
dominant group are tendencies toward cleanliness and order; thus, the hermeneutical 
resource “OCD” has been appropriated to better suit such communicative needs. This more 
dominant view of OCD trivializes the condition and makes it appear benign or even positive. 
Consequently, knowledge concerning the nature of OCD has been blocked, as “dominantly 
situated knowers … continue to misunderstand and misinterpret the world” (Pohlhaus Jr 
2012, 716). This misrepresentation is not employed to undermine the clinical understanding 
of OCD intentionally. Rather, it occurs through a lack of engagement with the interpretive 
framework of people with OCD. This behaviour goes uncorrected because the clinical use of 
 
8 Lainey Robinson (@herladysihp15), “I have cleaned our kitchen from top to bottom at office. Fridge completely 
cleaned out. All door handles cleaned 3 times a day. Toilets bleached regularly,” Twitter, 5 April 2020, 4:41 p.m., 
https://twitter.com/herladyship15/status/1246825193059880967.  
9 Sondra Radvanovsky (@SondraRadvan), “So, what does a *slightly* OCD person do while on a 14 day self-
quarantine??? Yep, clean out EVERYTHING! Today was the Tupperware drawer,” Twitter, 17 March 2020, 10:11 
p.m., https://twitter.com/SondraRadvan/status/1240038115323990016.  
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the term is perceived to be only salient to the marginalized subject, if the clinical meaning 
is known at all.  
We propose that the misuse of the term “OCD” is a unique case of wilful hermeneutical 
ignorance that can be added to Pohlhaus Jr’s account: the dominantly situated not only 
refuse to learn to use this hermeneutical resource but also appropriate the term, so that it 
reflects their own experience of the world. The term “OCD” has not been discarded but 
repurposed to suit the needs of the dominantly situated, thus silencing persons with mental 
disorders. The term “OCD” has not been ignored or ridiculed; on the contrary, it has been 
enthusiastically adopted in common use. But it is this seemingly benign common use that 
effectively occludes the full meaning of the term, leaving visible only its palatable aspects.  
OCD provides a paradigmatic example of wilful hermeneutical ignorance in psychiatric 
illness. However, another search on Twitter shows that such misappropriation is not limited 
to OCD. The search exposed the common trivialization of Autism (“We’re all on the 
spectrum that’s why it’s a SPECTRUM duh…”),10 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“… got so 
much ptsd from expressing my feelings to people who just dismiss them…”),11 and Bipolar 
Disorder (“Watching ‘married at first sight’ and it’s confirming that most [people] are 
bipolar…”).12 These discursive practices alter not only how we speak about mental disorders 
but also how we think about and understand them. By reducing mental disorders to non-
disruptive, non-threatening personality traits, certain mental disorders may be perceived 
as less serious and damaging than they actually are. Consequently, through wrongful 
depathologization, significant parts of the social experience of the marginalized subject are 
“obscured from collective understanding” (Fricker 2007, 155), as they have been robbed of 
hermeneutical tools to talk about their illness.  
 Conclusion 
By exposing the epistemic harm that arises from pathophobic stigmatization, the literature 
on epistemic injustice in psychiatry has already done much to amplify the voices of those 
with a mental disorder. This has cleared a path for greater epistemic sensitivity towards 
psychiatric patients’ testimonial credibility and collaboration on interpretive frameworks 
(Bueter 2019; Kurs and Grinshpoon 2018; Sanati and Kyratsous 2015; LeBlanc and Kinsella 
2016; Scrutton 2017).  
In this article, we focused on a new issue: we identified a unique process whereby 
psychiatric illness is depathologized in a way that trivializes the severity of the condition but 
maintains the stigma attached to mental disorder, resulting in what we term “wrongful 
depathologization.” Using OCD as a case study, we showed that wrongful depathologization 
may paint a partial and misleading picture of the disorder as a mere personality trait, rather 
than a legitimate illness. As the debilitating symptoms of psychiatric illness are absent from 
this picture, testimony regarding the severity of the illness may be discredited, and 
hermeneutical resources that capture the clinical aspects of the illness repurposed. 
Therefore, while the individual continues to be stigmatized by virtue of their status as 
“mentally ill,” their disorder is depathologized, as OCD is reduced to a mere personality 
trait. 
 
10 Fergie’s Ghostwriter (@sydneysidewalks), “Two men I met off of tinder have told me I’m probably on the 
spectrum,” Twitter, 28 April 2020, 1:57 a.m., 
https://twitter.com/sydneysidewalks/status/1254871598974341121.  
11 Moriah (@___Moriah), “Bruh I got so much ptsd from expressing my feelings to people who just dismiss 
them, idk what to do,” Twitter, 26 April 2020, 4:49 a.m., 
https://twitter.com/___Moriah/status/1254256272364494850.  
12 Nautii (@Rebelnyd), “Watching ‘married at first sight’ and it’s confirming that most ppl are bipolar lol,” 
Twitter, 24 April 2020, 3:39 p.m., https://twitter.com/rebelnyd/status/1253679956195975168.  
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We made a case for this claim, arguing that pathophobic stigmatization and 
trivialization can operate simultaneously in wrongful depathologization, giving rise to both 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice towards people with psychiatric illness. Wrongful 
depathologization can lower the credibility awarded to accounts of suffering (testimonial 
injustice) and obscure the more disabling aspects of OCD (wilful hermeneutical ignorance). 
Despite the positive connotations attached to the concept of depathologization, it can lead 
to increased stigmatization of patients because they now also come under suspicion of 
exaggerating their symptoms or malingering. Such claims exacerbate the risk of lowered 
credibility attributed to patients’ articulation of their experience, a risk they are already 
vulnerable to as psychiatric patients.  
We also scrutinized another claim about prejudice, which is that only, or mainly, 
negative prejudices are harmful. We suggested that it is not only negative identity prejudice 
that can lead to epistemic harm; positive stereotypes can also cause credibility deficit. By 
celebrating seemingly positive aspects of the condition, the debilitating symptoms of OCD 
become trivialized and obscured. We thus showed that the elimination of negative identity 
prejudice is not sufficient to guarantee epistemic justice. 
We are not, of course, suggesting that all attempts at depathologization are wrongful. 
Indeed, powerful voices within the neurodiversity movement and Mad Pride advocate 
depathologization as a social justice goal (Chapman 2019; Graby 2015; Rashed 2019; 
Walker 2013). The decisive factors are the presence or absence of trivializing and the 
identity of the one doing the depathologizing. If the depathologization happens through 
appropriation by people without psychiatric illness, then it is wrongful. But if the 
depathologization is the result of a considered, in-group, consciousness-raising effort, and 
does not lead to trivialization, then this depathologization is not wrongful. We thus leave 
open the possibility that people with OCD could, potentially, one day decide to 
depathologize OCD from the inside, on their own terms, whilst retaining treatment for the 
negative effects of their neurodiversity.  
A final question is whether other mental disorders are also vulnerable to wrongful 
depathologization. It is not possible to answer this question without further research, but it 
seems plausible that other mental disorders perceived as relatively mild may share this risk 
of wrongful depathologization. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), minor 
depression and perhaps some personality disorders seem, prima facie, to be susceptible to 
the same risks described here. We therefore suggest that further work is required to reveal 
the true pervasiveness of wrongful depathologization in mental disorder. 
We hope that the articulation of wrongful depathologization may open a space for new 
ways of understanding other marginalized experiences that are simultaneously stigmatized 
and trivialized. For example, cases of rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse, where the 
individual is vulnerable to stigmatization and victim-blaming, yet their experiences may be 
trivialized as a result of cultural attitudes that normalize sexual and domestic violence. As a 
new contribution to the literature, we hope that the concept of wrongful depathologization 
may bring to light further cases of epistemic injustice that are driven by the paradoxical 
twining of stigmatization and trivialization, the combined operations of which have 
heretofore gone undetected.  
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